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Mine is an unenviable assignment. How could anyone possibly oppose 
guidelines that are designed to protect the consumer? It takes a hard 
heart to question the proposed United Nations' promulgation of such good 
things as product safety and purity, consumer education, and international 
cooperation. 
Yet, sadly, when you push aside the verbiage customary in 
international position papers, you quickly find that the 11 Draft Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection, .. now before the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), would flunk a truth-in-labeling test. Indeed, the so-called 
Guidelines have the makings of a blueprint for a more centrally directed 
society than now exists in any of the market-oriented economies in the world. 
When we look beyond the label, it is apparent that the Guidelines are a 
model of vagueness and over-blown phraseology. Grand and unusual goals are 
set forth in language that is, at best, highly generalized and unclear. 
Attempts to carry out these Guidelines would surely result in worldwide 
confusion. 
Dr. Murray L. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American 
Business at Washington University in St. Louis. He is a former Chairman of 
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In any event, the Guidelines likely would produce results contrary to the 
goal of open international trade promoted for many years by the United States. 
Some parts of this code of conduct would impose burdensome and costly controls 
on the world 1 s economies -- and would tend to close, rather than open up, 
international markets. It is my belief that the United States and many other 
nations would be inviting disenchantment, as well as substantial costs, if 
they were to adopt this proposal. Above all, consumers themselves would be 
hurt rather than protected. 
In addition, the Guidelines show the United Nations to be drifting 
further away from its fundamental and crucial goal of promoting and 
maintaining world peace. By seeking to regulate the commerce and internal 
economic activities of its member nations, the U.N. is stepping into areas 
that are properly left to individual countries. Furthermore, the U.N. is 
diverting its limited resources from its basic role of peacekeeper. 
Implications of the Guidelines 
The Draft Guidelines for Consumer Protection contain, first of all, seven 
objectives which are written "with special emphasis on the needs of developing 
nations." The objectives are, almost necessarily, quite general in nature. 
Several of them are particularly problematic. For example, one objective is 
"to facilitate production patterns geared to meeting the most important needs 
of consumers." In economies organized along private enterprise lines, the 
needs of consumers are always the strongest influence on "production 
patterns"; the pressures of the marketplace dictate that. But the Guidelines 
suggest the need for a controlled, highly centralized economy in which 
consumer choices are in practice limited by the decisions of an all-wise 
central government. This objective strongly implies that a central government 
3 
must identify, and then control, the means of achieving the "most important 
needs" of consumers. We need only consult the dismal record of any of the 
world 1 s communist, centrally planned economies in feeding and meeting other 
essential needs of their citizens to know that promulgating this objective 
would severely hurt, rather than help, the developing nations. 
Moreover, this objective overlooks the importance of world trade in 
meeting the needs of consumers. More than ever before, the more developerl 
nations gear production for international markets rather than for the 
so-called "moPe impoPtant needs" of their own consumers. The case of Japan is 
instructive. If its post-war economy had been limited to meeting the 
needs of its own population, it surely would not enjoy the influence in world 
markets and the high standard of living that it has today. The same holds 
true for other market economies, ranging from West Germany to Hong Kong. 
Let me quote a second sweeping and ill-conceived objective of the 
Guidelines: 
To cupb business pPactices at the national and intePnational levels 
which advepsely affect consumePs (including abuses of a dominant 
position of ~Pket powep by pPivate and public entePpPises). 
Surely we all deplore business abuses, but how do we define business practices 
that "advePsely affect consumePs"? It is possi b 1 e that a so-ca 11 ed "advePse 
effect" in India or Zaire would instead be a salutary effect for consumers in 
the Caribbean or Colombia. Comparative effects make it extremely difficult, 
if not impossible, to carve in stone what is a "good" product or service and 
what is "bad ... 
Moreover, nearly any product or business practice may be arbitrarily 
1 abel ed 11 abusi ve" when it is held up against a standard that cannot be 
achieved or which consumers do not wish to pay for. Under the proposed 
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Guidelines, for example, Brand X Soap might be held to 11 adversely affect 11 
consumers simply because it does not have the 11 ideal 11 qualities of BrandY 
Soap. And where would this kind of thinking lead us? In many ways, this 
objective is a Pandora•s box which, once opened, could be used to limit the 
choices of consumers around the world. It could even be used as a 
justification for erecting trade barriers, or strengthening barriers that 
a 1 ready exist. 
Other objectives in the Guidelines are equally troubling when we 
consider their far-reaching nature. Here is an example: 
To pPomote just, equitable and sustainable economic and social 
development. 
This is an imposing, high-minded ideal. But who is going to define what is 
11 just 11 and 11 equitable 11 in any specific instance? Also, who is going to 
decide -- and then control what is 11 Sustainable 11 development? And here is 
another 11 0bjective 11 : 
To establish standaPds of ethical conduct fop those engaged in 
pPoduction and distPibution of goods and sePvices to consumePs. 
Certainly, ethical conduct is laudatory. But who will set the standards of 
11 ethical conduct 11 ? Who will place themselves above all others and regulate 
private behavior? I shudder to think how substantially a totalitarian 
interpretation of ethical conduct would differ from that of various free 
societies. 
The draft Guidelines also contain a set of general principles that 
governments are called upon to follow "to develop oP stpengthen theiP consumep 
pPotection policies." These principles are written as high-minded but vague 
and controversial notions of 11 rights. 11 The list is impressive and includes 
the right to: 
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o "physical safety fpom dangePous goods and sePVices" 
o "economic safety fpom offences OP rralpPactices" that deny 
benefits to consumePs 
o consumeP infoPmation and education 
o "available and effective PedPess" 
o fopm consumeP gpoups and have these gPoups' views PepPesented 
in "the decision-making pPocess" 
At first blush, most of these principles or "rights" seem to be 
admirable and worthy. But even if some kind of consensus could be reached on 
these principles, we must remember that they do not materialize out of thin 
air. Making them a reality is not automatic. In each case, they imply a 
substantial expansion of the role of government, at least in the economies 
now based on markets and competition. 
Furthermore, nowhere do the Guidelines stipulate that there are costs 
attached to the litany of benefits. A sense of balance between costs and 
benefits (and between costs and effectiveness) is essential if consumer 
protection is to be considered -- especially in less developed nations where 
resources are so limited. For example, the achievement of greater physical 
safety involves added costs in producing or distributing a product, 
particularly if the goal is anything approaching the idyllic "zero risk 11 
notion embedded in much existing consumer protection legislation. 
The United States has learned the lesson that government-mandated safety 
standards raise the price of products -- and, as a result, 11 pri ce out 11 some of 
the most vulnerable consumers (e.g., those with low incomes) from the market 
for those prorlucts. Ironically, such 11 pricing out 11 could lead to greater 
consumer risk. For example, requiring a safer but more expensive ladder than 
those now in common usage would probably cause many people climb on chairs and 
tables instead -- a much riskier approach than using existing ladders, with 
whatever shortcomings they possess. 
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Thus, product safety regulation can be an imperfect and even 
self-defeating tool. Moreover, individual beliefs of what is proper or 
adequate safety protection are not absolute. The world over, some people want 
more safety in a product, while some people may want less. In certain 
instances, people require a great deal of safety from a step-ladder or an 
appliance or a tool; in other instances, consumers do not. 
Who, then, is going to decide what constitutes "physical safety," as set 
forth in these Guidelines? Who is going to decide what are "dangepous goods 
and sePvices"? In terms of injuries, few consumer products may compete with 
the kitchen knife in terms of frequency of injuries. Clearly the utility of 
many products leads us to accept a reasonable amount of risk in our daily 
lives. 
Similarly, criticisms may be made about the statement in the Guidelines 
of "the Pight to such infoPmation as is necessary in oPdeP to mxke infoPmed 
choices." Transmitting information about goods and services is a worthy goal, 
if the information is useful and accurate. But the task needs to be carefully 
approached. Just take a look at the maze of fine print that is often required 
on products in this country -- fine print which results from the regulator's 
simple-minded notion that more information is always better than less. It is 
important to realize that market economies reduce the need for specific 
product information. Producers of goods and services know that they have a 
reputation at stake in their brand names; it is in their interest to maintain 
a high quality in what they produce rather than to provide voluminous (and 
often unused) 11 i nformati on. 11 
As for the "Pight to consumeP em..tcation," the U.N. Guidelines imply the 
same high-handed attitude towards educational systems as they do toward 
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economic systems. Consumers in less developed countries may, in fact, need a 
great deal of education with regard to products and services -- but they may 
need basic ectucational skills even more. As an educator, I am naturally 
suspicious when outside interests attempt to dictate the contents of a 
curriculum. The results are usually ineffective utilization of scarce 
education a 1 resources. 
A questioning attitude also must be taken with respect to the proposed 
"Pight to available and effective PedPess." Apart from quibbling about a 
useful definition of what constitutes "effective redress" at an international 
level, we would have to examine whether a new claims court, or something on 
that order, would duplicate or override existing legal systems. That is just 
one illustration among many of the dangers inherent in using broad, sweeping 
language in setting forth new policies at the international level. 
One general principle in the Guidelines raises very grave concerns: 
the r-ight to economic safety f-pom offenses OP ~lpPactices ~hich 
deny consumePs optimum benefit ~ithin theiP economic Pesou-pces. 
Taken at face value, this is merely gibberish. But given the frequency with 
which people in communist countries are thrown in jail for so-called "economic 
offenses" against the state, this provision is potentially a very dangerous 
part of the proposed U.N. Guidelines. Is "Big Brother 11 to determine what are 
"offenses and rralpmctices" and the point at which consumers have derived 
"optimum benefit" from resources? If this so-called principle does anything, 
it points out that the list of various "rights" is a matter for individual 
nations to decide. 
Further, the related principle that "tPansnational coPpoPations should 
eonfoPm to national and intePnational standaPds fop eonsumep pPoteetion" is 
not only vague in its stated purpose, but blatantly discriminatory. Why are 
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"transnational corporations" singled out for special attention, and not all 
enterprises? I can only conclude that transnationals are focused upon in 
these Guidelines as a scapegoat. 
The one-sidedness of the Guidelines is further indicated in the "right" 
of consumer organizations "to be consulted and to have theiP views PepPesented 
in the decision-making pPocess." The Guidelines make absolutely no provision 
for representing the views of private enterprise -- the very businesses that 
would be regulated under these Guidelines. In fact, this U.N. document is not 
written from the viewpoint of free-market societies: it speaks of "the 
decision-making pPocess, " as though only one can exist. That, I believe, is 
the give-away. These Guidelines are not intended for free, private-enterprise 
economies; they are designed to establish or promote centralized, planned 
economies in which the national government makes the key economic decisions. 
Further Implications of the Guidelines 
It is useful to list some of the specific Guidelines and let them speak 
for themselves. Do any of these sound like regulatory areas in which the 
United Nations should be involved? 
It is the Pesponsibility of the ~nufactuPeP to ensuPe that goods 
pPoduced aPe adequately safe fop intended and noPmal use. It is the 
Pesponsibi li ty of the impoPteP OP distPibutoP to ensuPe that no 
unsafe goods aPe bPought onto the ~Pket. • • • 
GoVePnments should • • • ensupe that the intended level of safety is 
met • • • thPough compliance with safety Pegulations, national OP 
intePnational standaPds, and volunta~ agPeements, and by PequiPing 
the maintenance of exact safety PecoPds. 
On the one hand, the Guidelines are clearly dictatorial: governments should 
"ensure" safety and, presumably, determine an "intended" level of safety. On 
the other hand, they ask governments to create paperwork mi 11 s "by Pequinng 
the ~intenance of exact safety PecoPds." There is no indication of having 
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learned from experience in the United States with agencies such as the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration. OSHA has been cutting back its 
paperwork requirements after learning that so much of its initial, onerous 
recordkeeping requirements were not needed. 
There are other provisions worthy of our attention. Here are several 
Guidelines listed under "protection of economic interest": 
Gove~ment poli~ies should seek to ensuPe that ~onsumePs obtain the 
maximum benefit fpom theiP e~onomi~ PesouP~es. 
Does not this describe the United Nations as a global "nanny"? Extending this 
notion to its "illogical conclusion," if I want to buy something silly for my 
wife's birthday, I could wind up violating a U.N. policy. 
Here's another provision: 
PPoducePs should ensuPe the availability of Peliable afte~sales 
sePVi~e. 
From the standpoint of economics and simple logic, this Guideline is total 
nonsense. Why presume that service must be provided by the producer, unless a 
sale is a non-competitive, tie-in sale? Production and service, after all, 
are not necessarily provided best by the same source -- at least this is true 
in competitive, open markets. Moreover, is this properly a concern of the 
United Nations? In the United States, we do not consider this an area for 
government regulation at all. 
The same criticisms apply to the following Guideline: 
Gove~ments should foPmulate and put into effect national codes on 
mapketing and otheP business pPactices to ensupe that such pPa~ti~es 
aPe faiP to consumeps. ConsumeP oPganizations should paPti~ipate in 
the elaboPation and monitoPing of such ~odes. 
The demand for "national codes" such as those mentioned here completely 
ignores the fact that several member nations of the U.N. have a federal form 
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of government in which the powers of the national government are limited. 
Examples include the United States, Australia, Canada, and West Germany. 
Two other Guidelines in the category of 11 protection of economic 
interests 11 again cast the shadow of 11 Big Brother ... One is the following: 
GovePnments should intensify theiP effoPts to pPeVent economic 
offenses thPough systematically monitoPing the adhePence to the 
established laws and standaPds by pPoducePs, distPibutoPs and othePs 
involved in the pPoVision of goods and sePVices. 
It goes on to state that consumer groups "should be eneouPaged and suppoPted 
in monitoPing economic offenses." What is the true meaning and purpose of a 
provision such as this one? What sort of government systematically monitors 
the actions of private citizens? What sort of government encourages and 
supports specific private groups in the monitoring of other private groups, as 
though they were licensed vigilantes? It is obvious that the authors of the 
Guidelines have little interest in either economic freedom or personal 
1 i berty. 
Another suspect Guideline is the following: 
GovePnments should consideP adopting a specific policy fop impPoving 
the distPibution system fop essential consumeP goods and sePVices, 
paPticulaPly in r-uPal apeas. 
Why only rural areas? But beyond that, what amount of choice does such a 
provision allow for? Who is going to decide what are the 11 essential 11 goods 
and services? 
Guidelines Relating to Specific Industries 
It is also helpful to examine the Guidelines which have been proposed for 
specific industries. Here is one example: 
GoVePnments, when fopmulating national policies and plans with 
PegaPd to food pPoduetion and distPibution, should take into account 
the needs of all consumeP gpoups. Such policies and plans should 
inteP alia pPovide fop adequate post-haPVest handling, stoPage, 
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pPo~essing and distPibution and should in~lude ~~hanisms fop 
appPopPiate a~tivity in the aase of seasonal flu~tuation in food 
supply and pPi~es. 
Again, let us look at the true meaning of a Guideline such as this one. How 
is a government going to take into account the needs of 11 all 11 consumer groups 
unless, in fact, it identifies and controls the 11 needs 11 of those groups? What 
possible role could private enterprise play in such a process? Certainly a 
very small one, since carrying out the Guideline will inevitably require 
centra 1 i zed planning. The same applies to "adequate post-haPVest handling, " 
and so forth, since a central government would have to direct those processes. 
But perhaps the most disturbing part of this provision is the bureaucratic 
language about "me~hanisms fop appPopPiate a~tivity in the oose of seasonal 
flu~tuation in food supply and pPi~e." Plainly and simply, this means price 
controls and, further, import controls. This Guideline is totally 
inconsistent with the workings of a modern private enterprise economy. 
The Guidelines• disregard of the market system is further displayed in 
two provisions under national strategies "foP food safety and quality 
~ontPol." One of these states: 
Food ~ontamination mvnitoPing and ~ontPol pPogPammes should be 
established OP stPengthened. • • • 
This Guideline gives absolutely no indication that some countries have already 
done this -- and done it quite well without United Nations mandates. Instead, 
what we have here is a simple-minded assertion and the belief, as always in 
these draft Guidelines, that more is better than less -- more regulation, more 
intervention and control, more power in a central government. Food 
standards or "Pemedial a~tions" in the words of the Guideline -- can be 
used by a nation to justify the erection of barriers to international trade. 
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Finally, we see once again how the marketplace gets superseded in another 
section concerning food: 
Business pPactices affecting the ppocessing and distPibution of food 
pPoducts and especiatty the maPketing of highty Pefined and expensive 
food pPoducts shoutd be Pegutated in oPdeP to ensuPe that such 
pPactices do not conftict with consumePs' intePests OP govePnment 
aims in the aPea of food poticy. 
Who is going to judge the so-called 11 conflict 11 between consumers' interests 
and business practices regarding the processing, distribution and marketing of 
food products? In free societies with market economies, if there is some kind 
type of 11 Conflict, 11 consumers will protect their interests by not buying the 
product. Resorting to regulation may simply project "goverrnment aims" in food 
policy -- and that is probably the true purpose of this provision. Moreover, 
why are ''highty pefined and expensive food pPoducts" singled out here? What 
all-wise power in a nation is going to determine that a specific category of 
food products presents a 11 conflict 11 with the interests of consumers, whereas 
another category does not? 
The Central Role of the U.N. 
International regulation of the production and distribution of goods and 
services via these Guidelines is a far cry from the central role of the United 
Nations which is, according to the U.N. charter, 11 to maintain international 
peace and security ... That role deserves the greatest amount of emphasis in 
the dangerous world in which we live. Frankly, it is sad to see the U.N. 
diverting its resources to large-scale forms of economic regulation when it is 
doing such an inadequate job of carrying out the basic tasks for which it was 
established. 
One purpose of the United Nations set forth in its charter is 11 to achieve 
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, 
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social, cultural or humanitarian character ... Surely this goal should be 
pursued in the interests of world peace. But these Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection make no effort to enhance economic cooperation among nations. They 
would, in fact, tend to damage economic conditions in developing nations, 
where the cause of peace is so crucial today. 
Above all, the U.N. charter explicitly prohibits the United Nations from 
intervening "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state." Much of what the Consumer Protection Guidelines has to offer 
would involve just such intervention -- and on a massive scale. The examples 
I have presented here show that, wittingly or unwittingly, the Guidelines 
point to a society in which governments in each nation of the world would have 
a much larger role in economic activity sometimes by orders of magnitude. 
Conclusion 
Regulation of internal economic activity is a matter for individual 
nations to carry out. As we have seen for many years now in the United 
States, regulation is a mixed blessing. It can be an imperfect, costly, and 
at times counterproductive instrument. Moreover, the proposed U.N. Consumer 
Protection Guidelines are not consistent, by any stretch of the imagination, 
with the workings of a private enterprise economy. Rather, they are designed 
to promote a much larger government role in the private sector. If the United 
Nations were to take on the role of global "nanny" in regulating the 
activities of private enterprise, it would likely do so at the expense of 
sacrificing many of the freedoms that are basic to the United States and many 
other member nations. 
To recapitulate, in this statement I have attempted to make three main 
points: (1) the U.N. Guidelines attempt to impose centralized control on the 
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economies of sovereign nations, (2) the United Nations should focus instead on 
its fundamental role of peacekeeper, and (3) the U.N. should not assume the 
role of global 11 nanny 11 or international consumer 11 cop. 11 
